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Privatizing Labor Law: Neutrality/Card Check Agreements
and the Role of the Arbitrator*
LAURA J. COOPER"*
How does a union gain the exclusive right to represent employees for purposes of
collective bargaining? How do employees exercise their statutory right to decide if
they want union representation? If you were to consult a labor law textbook or treatise
in an effort to answer this question, you would find a large body of statutory text and
case law from the federal courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
describing the elaborate legal process by which a union can seek the right to represent
the employees.' The process begins with the union gathering authorization cards from
employees and presenting the cards to the NLRB which will determine whether the
union made a timely and sufficient showing of employee interest and sought
representation in an appropriate bargaining unit. If, following an investigation and a
possible hearing, the Board finds it appropriate to schedule an election, an NLRB-
regulated campaign period will follow in which both the union and the employer
communicate with employees in an effort to influence their votes. Finally, the NLRB
conducts a secret ballot election and, if the union receives a majority of votes, and the
Board finds no inappropriate conduct affecting the outcome, the Board will certify the
union as the exclusive representative of the employees for dealing with the employer
regarding terms and conditions of employment.
For the last several years, however, this governmentally regulated process has been
increasingly overshadowed by a process created by private contracts between unions
and employers. These contracts, called neutrality/card check agreements, are usually
administered by private arbitrators empowered to interpret and apply them. In the last
six to eight years, the American labor movement has significantly bypassed the legal
structure Congress created for employees to express their desires regarding union
representation and instead privatized labor law. In entering into neutrality/card check
agreements, unions have focused on their goal of increasing union representation.
However, such privatization has the secondary consequence of placing in the hands of
private individuals serving as arbitrators some powers that had previously been the
exclusive province of the NLRB, and other powers that even the NLRB never
possessed. While scholarly, political, and administrative attention has understandably
been focused on the broad public policy implications of neutrality/card check
agreements, scant attention has been directed to what neutrality agreements require of
arbitrators and whether these expectations are consistent with the institutional capacity
* This article is based on the William R. Stewart Lecture given at Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington on November 13, 2007.
** J. Stewart & Mario Thomas McClendon Professor in Law and Alternative Dispute
Resolution, University of Minnesota Law School and member, National Academy of
Arbitrators. The author is grateful for the comments of Richard A. Bales, Martin H. Malin,
Dennis R. Nolan, and Marlin 0. Osthus on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000); ARcHMALD Cox, DEREK CURTIS BOK, ROBERTA.
GORMAN & MATTHEw W. FINKN, LABOR LAW (I 4th ed. 2006); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
(John E. Higgins, Jr. ed., 2006); ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FNKIN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW (2d ed. 2004).
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and role of arbitrators.2 Do arbitrators actually have the legal authority and
administrative capacity to assume this role? Can neutrality/card check agreements
achieve their intended objectives if arbitrators cannot perform that role? What role can
and should arbitrators play when unions join with employers in agreeing to privatize
labor law?
In Part I, I address the background of neutrality/card check agreements. Part II
outlines the legal context for such agreements. Part III explores the paradoxes and
challenges of the arbitrator's role in administering neutrality/card check agreements
and the final section provides some concluding remarks.
I. NEUTRALITY/CARD CHECK AGREEMENTS: THE BACKGROUND
What is a neutrality/card check agreement? As its name suggests, a neutrality/card
check agreement is a contract between a union and an employer that has two basic
components, a neutrality provision and a card check. Although including both
components is most typical, an organizing agreement could include one and not the
other. In a neutrality provision, an employer agrees that should the union seek to
organize its employees, the employer will remain neutral while its employees decide
whether they want union representation.3 In this Article, I use the term more
specifically to mean an agreement in which an employer agrees that during an
organizing campaign it will decline to exercise certain rights to communicate with
employees that it would otherwise enjoy under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), or that it will afford the union means of access to and communication with
employees that the employer would not be required to permit under the NLRA.4 As to
2. In addition to scholarly works cited elsewhere in this Article, other articles address the
public policy issues. See generally Charles I. Cohen, Joseph E. Santucci, Jr. & Jonathan C.
Fritts, Resisting its Own Obsolescence-How the National Labor Relations Board is
Questioning the Existing Law of Neutrality Agreements, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 521 (2006); Andrew M. Kramer, Lee E. Miller & Leonard Bierman, Neutrality
Agreements: The New Frontier in Labor Relations-Fair Play or Foul?, 23 B.C. L. REV. 39
(1981). Two presentations to the National Academy of Arbitrators spoke to some extent to the
tasks of arbitrators in enforcing neutrality/card check agreements, but neither explored whether
those tasks were consistent with the institutional capacity and role of arbitrators. George J.
Matkov, Jr., Larry G. Hall & Mark J. Mahoney, Navigating the Uncharted Seas of Negotiated
Tranquility: A Management Perspective on Employer Neutrality Agreements and Card Checks,
in ARBITRATION 2005: THE EVOLVING WORLD OF WORK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-EIGHTH
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 157 (Paul F. Gerhart & Stephen F.
Befort, eds., 2006); Leonard R. Page, Employer Neutrality and Card Checks: Address, in
ARBITRATION 2005: THE EVOLVING WORLD OF WORK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-EIGHTH
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 150, 152 (Paul F. Gerhart & Stephen
F. Befort, eds., 2006).
3. There can be considerable variation in the extent of neutrality that an employer agrees
to observe and the extent to which it preserves or waives various means of communicating with
its employees. See infra text accompanying notes 86-88.
4. Such agreements may also include provisions in which a union waives certain rights or
incurs additional obligations. Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under
Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 48 (2001); see infra
text accompanying notes 89-91.
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the card check, the employer agrees that if the union obtains cards from a majority of
those in the bargaining unit authorizing the union to represent the employee, the
employer will recognize and bargain with the union, foregoing its legal right to insist
upon a Board-conducted secret ballot election.5 A survey of neutrality/card check
agreements found that about three-quarters of them provided for an arbitrator to
resolve disputes arising under the agreement.
6
The story of neutrality agreements begins with unions' frustrations in trying to
counteract the decline in union density in the latter half of the twentieth century. In the
mid- 1950s union density reached its peak, including about a third of the workforce. By
the mid-1970s density had dropped to about a quarter of the workforce. 7 Since then,
the decline has accelerated to the point that union membership in 2007 included only
12. 1% of the workforce. 8 For employees in the private sector whose labor relations are
governed by federal law, the decline is even sharper than the 12.1% figure suggests.
The 12.1% figure includes union membership of government workers, which has been
rising as membership among private sector employees has declined. For 2007, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that while 39.8% of government workers were
union members, only 8.2% of private sector workers were union members.
9
There are multiple reasons for this decline in union density, but unions, legislators,
and scholars have identified employer opposition to unions, expressed in both legal
and illegal means, as a significant contributing factor to the decline in union
representation. 10 Lawful employer tactics thought to contribute to union representation
election losses include captive audience speeches, "aggressive and hierarchical"
employer communications, and "intense personal campaigning by supervisors."'"
5. Alternatively, organizational agreements between employers and unions might provide
for a different means to determine the union's majority status, such as an election privately
supervised by an arbitrator or a neutral organization, or an expedited election conducted by the
NLRB. This Article, however, is limited to the phenomenon of card checks as a means of
determining majority status.
6. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 4, at 48, 49 tbl.2.
7. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 109 (2007).
8. Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, (January 25, 2008),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm.
9. Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, (January 25, 2008),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm.
10. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 4, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 110-23, at 8-10 (2007) (Conf.
Rep.). The American Anthropological Association recently concluded from a review of
ethnographic research that American employees are not permitted to express their desire to join
unions because "there are insufficient disincentives to managerial lawbreaking in its resistance
to unions" and because "management uses tactics of intimidation and fear to coerce workers to
vote against unions." American Anthropological Association, AAA Policy Brief#l, at 2 (Sept.
2007), http://www.aaanet.org/gvt/whtsnew.htm.
11. James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for
Changing Paradigms, 90 IowA L. REv. 819, 832 (2005). The Supreme Court has recognized that
despite regulation by the NLRB, "representation campaigns are frequently characterized by
bitter and extreme charges, countercharges, unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal
accusations, misrepresentations and distortions" and that "labor and management often speak
bluntly and recklessly, embellishing their respective positions with imprecatory language." Linn
v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966).
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Election defeats are also blamed on unlawful employer conduct including threatening
employees with individual and collective adverse consequences, and firing union
supporters. 12 Empirical studies report that an employer's ability to take advantage of
administrative procedures to delay the conduct of elections and the commencement of
collective bargaining also contributes to union organizing failures.13 In the mid-1970s,
such criticisms led to legislative proposals to strengthen the NLRA to provide greater
legal protections and enhanced remedies for unions and workers during organizing
campaigns, but hopes of significant statutory changes were dashed when the Labor
Reform Act of 1977, which had passed in the House of Representatives by over a
hundred votes, died in the Senate in the face of a nineteen-day filibuster. 14
The failure to achieve statutory reform approximately coincides with the rise of
union self-help measures in the form of neutrality agreements. The first reported
neutrality agreement was signed in 1976. In that agreement, between the United Auto
Workers (UAW) and General Motors (GM), the company agreed that it would "neither
discourage nor encourage" the union's effort to organize other GM employees and that
GM would instead "observe a posture of neutrality in these matters." 15 While the
UAW-GM neutrality provision was included in a collective bargaining agreement
between an employer and a union that had already gained representative status as a
means of facilitating union organizing elsewhere, unions soon realized that it
sometimes also was possible to negotiate agreements with employers with whom the
union had not previously had a bargaining relationship. 1
6
While one can readily understand why an employer negotiating with the union that
represents its employees might be willing to trade neutrality in an organizing campaign
that might never eventuate for immediate union concessions at the bargaining table, it
is less apparent why a non-union employer might be willing to contract with a stranger
union to forego lawful campaign tactics and a government-conducted secret-ballot
election, both of which would enhance its chances of remaining union-free. 7 Some
advocates on behalf of employers have contended that neutrality/card check
agreements are usually signed by employers being harassed by union "corporate
campaigns" seeking to undermine the employer's relationship with customers,
shareholders, regulators and the general public by communications to the media and
complaints to regulatory agencies. 18 The more persuasive evidence, however, suggests
12. Brudney, supra note 11, at 832-33.
13. Id. at 833-34.
14. S. 2467, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong. (1977); 123 Cong. Rec. H32,613
(1977) (House passage); 124 Cong. Rec. S18,398, S18,400 (1978) (Senate filibuster).
15. Brudney, supra note 11, at 825 n.24 (citing Auto Workers Approve General Motors
Contract, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A- 13 (Dec. 8, 1976)).
16. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 4, at 45.
17. In an empirical study examining 760 representation elections conducted by the NLRB, I
found that unions that had collected authorization cards from 50-60% of the members of the
bargaining unit won only 40.9% of the subsequent Board-conducted elections. Laura Cooper,
Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of
the Assumptions Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Decision, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 87, 118
tbl. 9 (1984).
18. Congressional Testimony of Charles I. Cohen, on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Oct. 8, 2002, and Statement of Jarol B. Manheim, Professor of Media & Public
Affairs & Political Science, George Washington Univ., July 23, 2000, Appendix to Joseph Z.
1592 [Vol. 83:1589
PRIVATIZING LABOR LAW
that companies more likely sign such agreements as the result of a less coerced rational
business judgment. An NLRB Regional Attorney listed three reasons why employers
enter into such agreements: "to (1) resolve ongoing litigation resulting from union-
organizing efforts, (2) enlist the union to support its regulatory objectives, or (3) take
advantage of business opportunities available only to unionized employers."
19
A study reporting on interviews with thirty-four employers who had entered into
neutrality/card check agreements also revealed a diversity of motivations. A majority
of respondents said that they were seeking to avoid costs of not agreeing, including
potential picketing or work stoppages, the need for union concessions, or the potential
loss of a client or project. 20 A significant minority of employers were motivated by
potential benefits of unionization including cooperative worker-management
decisionmaking, assistance in obtaining qualified skilled labor, and assistance in
attracting business and customers.2' Some employers who thought union organization
inevitable welcomed the opportunity to shape the organizational process.22 In a recent
arbitration case, an employer representative testified that Yale-New Haven Hospital
had entered into an organizing agreement with a union that had sought for a decade to
represent hospital employees only because the City of New Haven had declined to
issue zoning approvals for a new cancer center unless the hospital took action to
resolve the continuing union organizational campaign.
23
Whatever the motivation, there is no question that many employers have signed
neutrality/card check agreements in recent years. Although it is impossible to measure
precisely the extent of recent union organization achieved using neutrality/card check
agreements, all indications are that it has been a remarkably successful mechanism.
Professor James A. Brudney calculated that of the three million workers organized by
the AFL-CIO between 1998 and 2003, less than one-fifth gained union representation
as the result of an NLRB election. 24 Reviewing Brudney's data in 2007, Professor
Cynthia Estlund concluded that probably more than half of the private sector
employees organized in the last six to eight years had been organized as a result of
neutrality agreements. 25 A 2004 article reported that the AFL-CIO was gaining
Fleming & Daniel B. Pasternak, Mutuality Agreements: Innovative Approaches to the Use of
Neutrality Agreements -A Unique Proposalfor Compromise, SM031 ALI-ABA 561,584,586
(2007).
19. Joseph A. Barker, Keeping Neutrality Agreements Neutral, MicH. B. J. Aug. 2005, at
33, 34.
20. Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Dancing with the Smoke Monster: Employer
Motivations for Negotiating Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 139, 144-45
(Richard N. Block, Sheldon Friedman, Michelle Kaminski & Andy Levin eds., 2006).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 146-47.
23. Yale-New Haven Hospital, slip op. at 1-2 (2007) (Kern, Arb.), DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA),
A-13 (Oct. 26, 2007), http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/r?Open=vros-78btxa. To cite an earlier
example, a 1989 lease and development agreement between the Minneapolis Community
Development Agency and the owners of a Hilton hotel to be built adjacent to the city's
convention center included provisions requiring neutrality and a card check for future hotel
employees. John W. Budd & Paul K. Heinz, Union Representation Elections and Labor Law
Reform: Lessons from the Minneapolis Hilton, LAB. STUD. J., Winter 1996, at 3, 9-10.
24. Brudney, supra note 11, at 828-29.
25. Cynthia Estlund, Something Old, Something New: Governing the Workplace by
15932008]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
150,000 to 200,000 new members per year through card checks, but only 70,000
through federal elections. 26 A single union, the Service Employees International
Union, said it had recruited 100,000 members as a result of these agreements.
27
Another study that collected organizing agreements and measured union success under
them found 78.2% of the agreements that included both neutrality and card check
provisions resulted in unions gaining representative status.
28
This success has now brought the future of union recognition through card check
procedures to an uncertain crossroads. Unions want to make card check recognition
easier to obtain while employers hope to make it illegal or so unattractive or unlikely
of success as not to be worth pursuing. Depending on the actions of Congress, the next
President, and the National Labor Relations Board, we may be either about to witness
a vast expansion of card check recognition or its rapid demise.
On the one hand, the next Congress may enact and the next President may sign the
Employee Free Choice Act, which would permit the NLRB to certify union
representative status on the basis of an authorization card majority.29 This Act was
passed in the House of Representatives in March 2007, but fell short of the votes
needed to end debate in the Senate. 30 The Act will surely reappear in the next
Congress.3'
On the other hand, a majority of the NLRB recently began to decide a series of
cases that may either outlaw card check recognition outright or, by redefining its
procedural details, so undercut its value to unions as to make it largely worthless as an
organizing tool.32 In 2004, two members of the Board suggested that it might be time
to question the fundamental assumption that an employer had the right to waive what
the Board members viewed as a fundamental right of employees to vote in a Board
election. 33 At the end of September 2007, a majority of the NLRB decided the long-
Contract Again, 28 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 351, 358 (2007).
26. Aaron Bernstein, Can This Man Save Labor?, Bus. WK., Sept. 13, 2004, at 80, 86.
27. William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of
Labor-Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J.
461,485(2007).
28. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 4, at 52 tbl.3.
29. H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007).
30. Supporters of Card Check Bill Fall Short of Votes Needed to Limit Senate Debate,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at AA-2 (June 27, 2007).
31. Similar legislation has recently been enacted in several states permitting card check
procedures to establish the majority status of unions seeking to represent state and local
government employees who are outside the jurisdiction of the NLRA. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
150A, § 5(c) (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2007); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A: 10, IX (1999 &
Supp. 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.682 (2007).
32. In recent years, House and Senate members have introduced bills to make it unlawful
for the NLRB to require an employer to recognize a union whose majority status is based on a
card check, but such efforts have no chance of success in a Congress with a Democratic
majority. See, e.g., Secret Ballot Protection Act, H.R. 866, 110th Cong. § 3(b) (2007); Secret
Ballot Protection Act of 2007, S. 1312, 110th Cong. § 3(b) (2007).
33. Shaw's Supermarkets, 343 N.L.R.B. 963, 964 (2004) (Battista & Meisburg) ("[W]e
have some policy concerns as to whether an employer can waive the employees' fundamental
right to vote in a Board election."). More recently, a majority of the Board seemed to leave open
the question of the validity of neutrality/card check agreements. Dana Corp./Metaldyne Corp.,
351 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at 3 (Sept. 29, 2007) ("We also do not address the legality of card-check
and/or neutrality agreements preceding recognition.").
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awaited consolidated Dana/Metaldyne case.34 The Board majority ruled there that if an
employer recognizes a union on the basis of authorization cards, the employees must
be notified of a right to act within 45 days to petition the NLRB for an election to
determine if the employees continue to want union representation. 35 Now, unions that
gain representative status through card checks may have their representative status put
in doubt for months or even years while simultaneously facing the always significant
challenges of establishing a collective bargaining relationship. The two Board
members dissenting in Dana/Metaldyne described the decision as "cut[ting] voluntary
recognition off at the knees." 36 Other recent cases also have undermined the benefit of
the card check process, and still others currently pending could weaken it even
further.37
II. THE LEGAL CONTEXT FOR NEUTRALITY/CARD CHECK AGREEMENTS
A. The Substantive Law
If the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) generally envisions a union
organizational process governed by the NLRB and culminating in a secret-ballot
election, what is the legal status of recognition resulting from neutrality/card check
agreements? While the NLRB has historically considered Board-conducted elections
as the "preferred route" 38 and the Supreme Court has said that elections have
"acknowledged superiority, '39 both affirm that the NLRA permits an employer to
recognize a union on the basis of majority status demonstrated not by secret ballot, but
by a showing of authorization cards.40 Indeed, the Board has sometimes
34. Dana/Metaldyne, 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28.
35. Id. The Board will hold the election if the petition is supported by 30% or more of the
unit employees. Id. at 10.
36. Id. at 14 (Liebman & Walsh, dissenting in part).
37. In Supervalu, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (Sept. 30, 2007), the Board held that an
employer did not commit an unfair labor practice by repudiating a card check provision in a
collective bargaining agreement requiring it to recognize the union as the representative of
employees at other stores if employees at the other stores were not appropriately included in the
same bargaining unit as the employees covered by the agreement.. In Shaw's Supermarkets
(UFCW), 343 N.L.R.B. 963 (2004), the Board agreed to review whether an employer's
agreement to an after-acquired-store clause in a collective bargaining agreement waived its right
to petition for a Board-conducted election and whether, if it did, such a waiver was a violation
of public policy. In Marriott HarfordDowntown Hotel (UNITE), 347 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (Aug. 4,
2006), the Board agreed to consider whether a union's request for a card check agreement was a
demand for recognition that permitted an employer to petition for an NLRB election. Later,
however, a three-member panel of the Board affirmed the decision of the regional director to
dismiss the employer's election petition. Marriott Hartford Downtown Hotel, No. 34-RM-88
(N.L.R.B. 2007). An attorney involved in the case speculated that the same issue may be posed
in another case still pending before the Board. DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), A- 12 (Sept. 21, 2007).
38. NLRB v. Gissel Packing, Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).
39. Linden Lumber Div. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304 (1974).
40. "Voluntary recognition itself predates the National Labor Relations Act and is
undisputedly lawful under it." Dana Corp./Metaldyne Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 28, at 3 (Sept.
29, 2007) (citing Gissel, 395 U.S. at 595-600); Linden, 419 U.S. at 304 (noting that
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enthusiastically embraced the idea of voluntary recognition: "It is a long-established
Board policy to promote voluntary recognition and bargaining between employers and
labor organizations, as a means of promoting harmony and stability of labor-
management relations.' In the absence of prior agreement, however, an employer
presented with evidence of a card-based majority has no legal obligation to recognize
the union.42 If, however, an employer agrees in advance that it will recognize a union
on the basis of an authorization card-based majority, the employer is guilty of the
unfair labor practice of refusal to bargain if it then reneges on its promise.43
The neutrality portion of an employer's neutrality/card check agreement has also
been held not to be inconsistent with national labor policy. In the absence of threats or
promises, the NLRA explicitly protects an employer's right to express to its employees
information and arguments designed to discourage employees from seeking union
representation. 44 It has been recognized, however, that since employers are free in the
absence of an agreement to remain silent in the face of a union organizational
campaign, they are also free to agree to maintain neutrality.45
B. Judicial Enforcement
In addition to being enforceable through NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings,
neutrality/card check agreements alternatively are enforceable in federal court. Section
301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides jurisdiction in federal court
for "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce .... Although this
provision is most commonly applied to afford federal court jurisdiction to enforce
collective bargaining agreements between employers and unions with majority status,
the Supreme Court has held that its scope extends to the breadth of its terms. The
statute does not require that the contract at issue be a collective bargaining
agreement.47 Nor does it require that the labor organization representing employees be
the majority representative of those employees.48 The Supreme Court held that this
broad interpretation was consistent not only with the language of the statute but also
authorization cards may "adequately reflect employee sentiment").
41. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 464,466 (1999).
42. Linden, 419 U.S. at 309-10.
43. Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 710 (1961); Houston Div. of Kroger Co., 219
N.L.R.B. 388, 389 (1975).
44. NLRA, § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000) (stating that "[t]he expressing of any views,
argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the
provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit.").
45. Hotel Employees, Restaurant Employees Union, Local 2 v. Marriott Corp., 961 F.2d
1464, 1470 (9th Cir. 1992). The NLRB has acknowledged the enforceability of employer
neutrality obligations under Section 301. The New Otani Hotel & Garden, 331 N.L.R.B. 1078,
1081 n.9 (2000).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000).
47. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 25
(1962).
48. Id. at 29.
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with its intended purpose of promoting "responsible and stable labor relations. 4 9
Lower federal courts have applied the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the
scope of Section 301(a) specifically to hold that neutrality/card check agreements are
enforceable in federal court. 50 In doing so, the courts rejected all of the employers'
arguments that enforcement of neutrality/card check agreements would be inconsistent
with federal labor policy because such agreements usurp the role of the NLRB, deny
employees the opportunity to vote in a secret ballot election, and require employers to
remain silent during organizational campaigns. 51
Situating federal court jurisdiction under Section 301 has substantive law
consequences for the role of arbitrators in disputes arising under neutrality/card check
agreements. The Supreme Court has held that when Congress granted courts Section
301 subject matter jurisdiction, it also vested courts with authority to develop through
the process of deciding cases the substantive law to govern interpretation of
agreements between unions and employers.52 This judicially created law includes rules
for determining when a dispute is subject to arbitration and when an arbitrator's award
may be judicially vacated.
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., the Court articulated the
basic rule for determining arbitrability in the context of a dispute alleging violation of a
collective bargaining agreement: "An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage." 53 That presumption of arbitrability has been held
equally applicable to disputes arising under neutrality/card check agreements.54
A second prong of federal common law governing collective bargaining agreements
is a high level of judicial deference to arbitration awards. In Enterprise Wheel, the
Court held that allowing federal courts to evaluate the merits of awards would
undermine the federal policy of enforcing the parties' bargain that arbitrators'
decisions are to be final. The Court stated that an arbitrator's award is legitimate and
should be enforced so long as "it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement." 55 More recently, the Court emphatically restated the necessity for judicial
deference, saying that courts should "only in rare instances" set aside awards, and that
even if a court is convinced that the arbitrator committed "serious error," the award
should still not be set aside so long as the arbitrator was "even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority. 56 This precedent
49. Id. at 27.
50. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561,
567 (2d Cir. 1993); Marriott Corp., 961 F.2d 1464, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1992).
51. JP. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d at 567; Marriott Corp., 961 F.2d at 1469-70.
52. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
53. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,582-83 (1960).
54. United Steelworkers v. TriMas Corp., No. 07-1688 (7th Cir. July 3,2008), DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA), E-64 (July 7,2008); NY Health & Human Serv. Union 1199/SE1U v. NYU Hosp.
Ctr., 343 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2003); United Steelworkers v. Hibbing Joint Venture, 2007 WL
2580546 at * 6-8 (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 2007). Cf SEIU v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 344 F.3d 977,
983 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the presumption of arbitrability to neutrality/election agreements).
55. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
56. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)
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has been applied in the context of neutrality/card check agreements to hold that, there
too, the court's power ofjudicial review is "extremely limited."57
From this articulation of the substantive law developed under Section 301 it would
seem that the arbitrator in neutrality/card check agreements occupies a clearly defined
and highly respected place in the legal landscape. However, that impression turns out
to be false when one realizes that the arbitrator is simultaneously occupying a different
and far more precarious place in an alternative legal universe.
C. NLRB Deferral
The National Labor Relations Board has parallel jurisdiction over most of the issues
likely to be decided by arbitrators under neutrality/card check agreements. Unlike the
federal courts that are obliged to pay extraordinary deference to arbitrators' decisions,
the NLRB need not pay any at all.58 Most of the issues to be considered by arbitrators
interpreting and applying neutrality/card check agreements are representational issues
such as the definition of an appropriate bargaining unit and the determination of
majority status. The authority to resolve such representational issues, however, is one
of the principal statutory responsibilities of the NLRB. 59
Issues that arise under neutrality/card check agreements are only one type of
question over which labor arbitrators and the NLRB have overlapping jurisdiction. For
example, an employer's subcontracting could be viewed as a violation of contract
subject to arbitration as well as the unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the
NLRB of refusal to bargain. 60 The discharge of a union steward could be seen as the
arbitrable issue of whether the employer violated a "just cause" contract provision, or
whether the employer violated the employee's statutory right not to be discriminated
against for participation in union activities. 6 1 The question of whether a union
demonstrated majority support in an appropriate bargaining unit could be presented to
an arbitrator under a neutrality/card check agreement or raised by a representation
petition filed with the NLRB.62
In deciding individual cases of such overlapping jurisdiction, the NLRB has
developed a jurisprudence of deferral. This jurisprudence is intended to achieve
multiple objectives-to foster collective bargaining by encouraging parties to abide by
their agreed-upon dispute resolution process, to conserve agency resources, and to
protect the parties from duplicative litigation.63 The level of deference that the agency
(quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). Eastern
Associated Coal also held that courts have the authority to overturn an arbitrator's award that
violates public policy, but only when the court can identify an "explicit, well-defined, and
dominant public policy... ascertained by reference to positive law and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests." Id. at 63. As neutrality obligations and the card
check recognition process are not made unlawful by statutes or by decisions of courts or the
NLRB, it is unlikely that an arbitrator's decision under a neutrality/card check agreement would
fall within this narrow public policy exception.
57. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d at 567-68.
58. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2000).
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000).
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2000).
63. United Techs. Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 558-60 (1984).
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will afford to an arbitral award is significantly dependent upon the issue involved. The
NLRB eagerly defers to arbitrators' awards in those areas of contract interpretation in
which it views arbitrators as possessing special skills and expertise. 64 The NLRB is
also generally willing to defer to arbitrators' decisions in cases involving individual
statutory rights such as allegations of discrimination because of union activities, so
long as, in deciding the contractual issue, the arbitrator was presented generally with
the same set of facts that would have been relevant in deciding the statutory issue.65
The Board's deferral policy, however, is far less accepting of arbitrators' decisions
regarding representational issues, precisely the type of questions likely to be posed to
arbitrators under neutrality/card check agreements.
In St. Mary's Medical Center, the Board articulated its approach to arbitrators'
decisions on representational issues: "Although the Board only infrequently defers to
arbitration in representation proceedings, the Board will find deferral appropriate when
the resolution of the issue turns solely on the proper interpretation of the parties'
contract. Where resolution turns on statutory policy, the Board will not defer.",
66
This general refusal to defer to arbitrators' decisions in representational matters may
make theoretical sense because representational issues may put into question the very
existence of the collective bargaining relationship, or the fundamental applicability of
the collective bargaining agreement from which the arbitrator's authority is derived.
However, the Board's manner of articulating representational issue deferral
policy-purporting to draw a bright line between issues turning on contract
interpretation and those turning on statutory policy-is problematic in practical
application because representation issues presented to arbitrators sit precisely on that
line implicating both the contract and the statute. The application of this test, which
artificially forces the Board to classify issues that are neither wholly contractual nor
wholly statutory into a single category, has produced two problems-incoherent
application of the test and an opportunity to manipulate the categories to achieve
desired ends.
A typical example of such incoherence can be seen in the Board's decision in
Central Parking System, Inc. 67 In this opinion, a three-member panel divided with the
majority finding the issue to be solely contractual, and the dissenter equally
emphatically labeling it as statutory. There, a union sought to enforce a provision in a
collective bargaining agreement with Central Parking requiring the employer to
64. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839 (1971).
65. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 573 (1984). The arbitration process must be "fair and
regular" and "all parties [must] have agreed to be bound." Id. The Board also requires that the
arbitrator's decision satisfy the low threshold of not being "clearly repugnant" to the NLRA,
which it defines as a decision "not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act." Id.
at 574. More recently, the Board has held that an award may be considered consistent with the
NLRA where the award is supported by some Board precedent despite being inconsistent with
contrary Board precedent. Kvaerner Philadelphia Shipyard, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 36, at 3
(June 9, 2006).
66. St. Mary's Medical Center, 322 N.L.R.B. 954, 954 (1997) (citations omitted). The
Third Circuit recently upheld the Board's policy also not to defer to an arbitrator's authorization
card count if the Board independently finds that the arbitrator counted invalid cards. NLRB v.
Regency Grand Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 265 Fed. Appx. 74,2008 WL 449782, at *77-*78 (3d
Cir. 2008).
67. Central Parking System, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 390 (2001).
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recognize the union as the representative of employees at after-acquired facilities.
Central later acquired Allright. When Central refused recognition on the ground that
Allright was a separate company that was not a party to the agreement, the union
demanded arbitration. In response, the employer petitioned the NLRB to conduct a
representation election among Allright's employees.68 The Board majority dismissed
the employer's petition, applying the test from St. Mary's Medical Center,69 to
conclude that the issue turned solely on interpretation of the contract. The dissenting
Board member listed five different statutory questions that he thought necessarily
required resolution by the agency rather than the arbitrator. 70 The line between
statutory and contractual issues appears highly subjective and indeterminate if one
Board member can find five statutory questions implicated while two other members
find none.
The insistence on classifying as either statutory or contractual matters that could be
given either label also creates an opportunity manipulatively to label issues to achieve
desired ends without having to articulate why those ends are desired. The inference of
manipulation can be drawn from Board decisions that sometimes defer to arbitration
largely statutory matters while refusing to defer largely contractual cases.
In Verizon Information Systems, the parties had entered into a neutrality/card check
agreement, but could not agree upon the scope of the appropriate bargaining units.7'
Their agreement provided that, in the event of impasse, determination of an appropriate
bargaining unit was to be made by an arbitrator. The parties confined the arbitrator's
authority exclusively to the bargaining unit issue and said that in making the decision
the arbitration "shall be guided... by the statutory requirements of the National Labor
Relations Act and the precedential decisions of the National Labor Relations Board
and Appellate reviews of such Board decisions." 72 It would be hard to present a case
that more clearly turned on statutory issues rather than interpretation of the parties'
contract because the contract's sole function was to require application of the statute.
Yet, the Board held in Verizon that the agency would not consider a representation
petition the union filed with the NLRB, 7 in which the Board would have had the
responsibility of defining the appropriate bargaining unit. 74 Instead, the Board
overturned its Regional Director and dismissed the union's petition, holding that the
union was bound by its agreement to have the issue resolved by an arbitrator because
the union had already taken advantage of another term of the agreement by requesting
and receiving from the employer information about the number and classification of
employees at various work locations.75 While the Board's opinion suggested that its
holding was narrowly based on estoppel, the factual circumstances posed in Verizon, in
which a party first benefitted from some provision of a neutrality/card check agreement
68. Id. at 390.
69. See supra text accompanying note 66.
70. 335 N.L.R.B. at 392.
71. Verizon Info. Sys., 335 N.L.R.B. 558, 558 (2001).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 560.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
75. Verizon, 335 N.L.R.B. at 560.
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before seeking assistance from the Board, seem likely to occur in most, if not all, cases
where Board assistance would be sought.76
While in Verizon the Board deferred to the arbitrator's decision in a case turning
entirely on statutory issues, the opposite occurred in Advanced Architectural Metals,
Inc., where the Board refused to defer to an award that appeared to turn entirely on
contractual interpretation." There, the employer had been a party to a series of
collective bargaining agreements of varying scope. Upon expiration of an agreement
covering employees in the employer's shop, the union submitted a grievance asserting
that those employees were now represented by it under a multiemployer agreement that
covered "all work" in the employer's "warehouses, shops, or yards. 78 While the
grievance was pending, but before the arbitrator issued an award, the employer
submitted to the NLRB a unit clarification petition asking for a declaration that the
shop employees were a separate unit. The NLRB Regional Director deferred the
representation issue pending arbitration on the ground that the issue was solely
contractual. After an arbitration award in which the arbitrator interpreted the contract
to conclude that it covered the shop employees, the Regional Director dismissed the
employer's petition, deferring to the arbitrator's award. 79 The Board reversed the
Regional Director's decision, finding that deferral was inappropriate on the ground that
the issues involved were in part statutory including "appropriate unit principles,
community of interest criteria, and accretion standards. 8 0
In summary, this review of the legal context for neutrality/card check agreements
has shown that both the NLRB and courts have found such agreements to be
enforceable and have accepted both neutrality pledges and card check recognition
procedures as consistent with the NLRA. These agreements typically place at least
initial responsibility for enforcement in the hands of arbitrators. Once an arbitrator has
rendered an award interpreting a neutrality/card check agreement, the finality of that
award fundamentally turns on which institution is asked to review or enforce the
arbitrator's award. If heard by a court, the arbitrator's decision will receive
extraordinary deference, but if heard by the NLRB, the award may be entirely
disregarded.
III. THE ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR
Labor arbitrators interpreting typical provisions of collective bargaining
agreements, such as those prohibiting employers from discharging employees without
"just cause," or defining management rights to subcontract, operate within a regime
76. It seems reasonable to expect that a party to a neutrality/card check agreement would
not immediately after entering into such an agreement petition the NLRB to address an issue
covered by the agreement. Rather, it seems most likely that a party would seek the assistance of
the NLRB only when, in the midst of performance under the agreement, a party became
dissatisfied with the other side's performance in some respect.
77. Advanced Architectural Metals, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 111, at 2 (Aug. 31, 2006).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id. at 2. The dissenting Board member thought that the case raised none of these
statutory issues. Id. at 4-5.
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with well-defined substance and procedures.8 1 Similarly, when the NLRB decides
representation issues, such as determining an appropriate bargaining unit or deciding
whether an authorization card was signed under coercion, it operates under procedures
and substantive doctrine well defined in statutory text and more than seventy years of
case decisions.8 2 When an arbitrator is asked to interpret and apply the provisions in a
neutrality/card check agreement, the arbitrator is asked to perform a task distinct from
both the ordinary work of a labor arbitrator and the ordinary work of the NLRB. The
task requires the arbitrator substantively to replicate some of the Board's activities, but
without equivalent procedural mechanisms or institutional authority. In part, the
arbitrator is asked to develop substantive doctrine beyond the scope of NLRB-
developed law, but in a different context-in a private proceeding-that nevertheless
implicates issues of national labor policy. The arbitrator's task is made even more
difficult because it must be done in a sense blindfolded. At the time that the arbitrator
is engaged in decisionmaking, the arbitrator has no way of knowing whether those
decisions will be reviewed by a deferential court or a dismissive federal agency. These
are the paradoxes of the role of the arbitrator in neutrality/card check agreements. In
this Part, I identify the variety of issues that may be presented to arbitrators under
neutrality/card check agreements and evaluate the extent to which arbitrators have the
appropriate procedural powers and institutional competence appropriately to resolve
these matters.
Although provisions for employers to remain neutral in a union organizational
campaign and provisions in which employers agree to recognize a union on the basis of
an authorization card check are commonly found joined in combined neutrality/card
check agreements, the two prongs of the agreement present quite different tasks for the
arbitrator. When an arbitrator interprets and applies an employer's contractual
obligation to refrain from exercising rights it would otherwise have under the NLRA to
communicate with its employees, the arbitrator is deciding questions that would never
be presented to the NLRB. Arbitrators' decisions interpreting and applying neutrality
provisions necessarily resolve fundamental labor policy issues in a private process
where employees whose rights are at stake are wholly unrepresented.
On the other hand, the issues an arbitrator confronts under a card check provision
have significant parallels to issues considered by the NLRB, but they may be more
difficult for an arbitrator to resolve because of the procedural differences between the
administrative and arbitral processes. Although card check issues may appear to be the
same in both arbitral and agency settings, the different settings may warrant different
answers to the same questions.
Finally, should an arbitrator find that an employer has breached its contractual
obligations under the neutrality/card check agreement, the arbitrator will need to
determine an appropriate remedy, a remedy that will have national labor policy
81. See generally THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEWS OF ARBITRATORS
(Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 2d ed., 2005); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS
(Alan Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed., 2003); Laura J. Cooper, The Process ofProcess: The Historical
Development of Procedure in Labor Arbitration, in ARBITRATION 2005: THE EVOLVING WORLD
OF WORK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 99 (Paul F. Gerhart & Stephen F. Befort, eds., 2006).
82. See supra note 1.
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implications, most likely in a circumstance in which the remedial issue is not addressed
either in the parties' agreement nor in the case law of the NLRB.
A. Arbitral Interpretation of Neutrality Provisions
In the absence of a neutrality agreement, both the First Amendment and the explicit
language of Section 8(c) of the NLRA afford employers broad rights to communicate
anti-union messages to employees in a variety of ways. 83 Substantively, the employer
is free to disparage the union to whatever extent it wishes, including making false
claims, so long as the employer's message contains no promises or threats.
84
Procedurally, the employer is free to hold unlimited numbers of mandatory meetings
on company time, to distribute literature to employees at work and mail it to their
homes, to communicate by telephone and e-mail, and to have its supervisors express
anti-union messages in individual conversations with employees.85 When an employer
enters into a neutrality agreement with a union, it is waiving some or all of these
communicational rights. While I have so far addressed neutrality agreements
generically, as if they all restricted employer communications to the same extent,
individual agreements as the product of separate negotiations place varying levels of
restriction upon the content and form of employer communications.
Researchers Adrienne E. Eaton and Jill Kriesky collected 118 neutrality/card check
agreements and observed considerable variety in the substance of the neutrality
provisions. They included (1) a pledge of "neutrality" without further definition; (2)
neutrality definitions that allowed employers to communicate "facts" to employees,
sometimes only in response to inquiries; (3) a prohibition on the employer
communicating opposition to the union; (4) an obligation for the employer to
communicate to employees that it welcomed their choice of a representative; (5)
prohibitions on the employer attacking or demeaning the union; (6) obliging the
employer only to strive to "create a climate free of fear, hostility, and coercion;" (7)
obliging the employer to campaign in a "positive" manner or to keep its comments
"pro-company;" and (8) stating in varying levels of detail that the employer would not
make any statements regarding potential effects of unionization. 86 Some contracts
released employers from their neutrality pledge if the union failed to abide by a
contractual obligation not to attack the employer. 87
Some agreements placed explicit restrictions on the employer's means of
communication. The researchers found contracts that precluded (1) one-on-one
meetings; (2) captive audience meetings; (3) communicating in writing or by telephone
83. NLRA, § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000); NLRB v. Gissel Packing, Inc., 395 U.S. 575
(1969). For the text of Section 8(c), see supra note 44.
84. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 129-30 (1982).
85. See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1; GORMAN & FINKIN, supra
note 1.
86. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 4, at 47. See also, AFL-CIO, BARGAINING TO ORGANIZE
REFERENCE MANUAL 35-38 (2000) (providing sample neutrality language from union-
management contracts).
87. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 4, at 53.
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with employees about the organizing drive; and (4) employers questioning employees
about union activities or membership.
88
While the union's objective in these agreements is to restrict the employer's
behavior, often employers are able to gain in exchange a waiver of some union rights
or an imposition of additional restrictions upon the union beyond those required by
law. Three-quarters of the agreements examined by Professors Eaton and Kreisky
placed some limit on union behavior. 89 The most common was an agreement not to
attack management. 90 Less common provisions required the union to notify the
employer when commencing a specific campaign or to require that the campaign be
conducted within a specified time period.9 '
Neutrality agreements may also afford union organizers affirmative rights to
communicate with employees beyond those required by the NLRA. Professors Eaton
and Kreisky found that in more than a third of the contracts they collected unions were
afforded broader access to lists of employees than required by law,92 under which there
is no obligation to provide lists to facilitate the collection of authorization cards and
under which lists need only be provided very late in an organizing campaign just
before a scheduled election. 93 While the NLRA substantially limits the access of union
organizers to an employer's property for the purpose of communicating with
employees, 94 Eaton and Kriesky found that about two-thirds of the neutrality
agreements they studied gave the union physical access to the employer's property. 95
Not surprisingly, the researchers also found that the text of the neutrality obligations
gave rise to disputes between the parties that were presented to arbitrators, particularly
when contracts included only general language or when they preserved for the
employer some opportunity to communicate.
96
A review of requests for arbitration under contract provisions for employer
neutrality and union access reveal that the issues raised are largely ones that would
never be addressed by the NLRB because they concern contract rights and prohibitions
that exceed those established by statute. In SEIU v. St. Vincent Medical Center, the
union sought arbitration of a claim that the employer's campaign communications had
violated a provision requiring the parties' communications to be limited to "that which
is factual. 97 In another case, the arbitrator had to determine whether the employer had
violated its contractual obligation to "send" the employees a letter explaining the
employer's neutrality (the specific content of which was an attachment to the parties'
agreement) when the employer read the letter to the employees rather than mailing it.98




92. Id. Examples of contract language requiring early provision of lists of employees
appear in AFL-CIO, supra note 86, at 43-44.
93. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239 (1966).
94. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532-34 (1992).
95. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 4, at 48. Examples of contract language affording unions
access to employer property appear in AFL-CIO, supra note 86, at 40-42.
96. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 4, at 47.
97. SEIU v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 344 F.3d 977, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2003).
98. Alton Machine Works, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1801, 1802-04 (2006) (Heggie,
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In Yale-New Haven Hospital, the arbitrator had to determine, among other things, the
meaning of a contractual prohibition against conducting "mandatory meetings" with
employees when the employer labeled meetings as voluntary and the union claimed
that they were, as a practical matter, mandatory. 99 In that extraordinary case, the
arbitrator, over a nine-month period, submitted decisions on eighty-one different
claims by the parties that the other side had violated their organizing agreement.' 
In Alden North Shore, an arbitrator issued a forty-five-page-long award addressing
numerous issues. 10' They included whether the employer had violated a provision
requiring the employer to afford union representatives "reasonable access to
Employees on company property during reasonable times;"' 0 2 whether the employer
had a reasonable justification for the delay in furnishing a list of employee names and
addresses; whether the employer's neutrality obligation was breached by increasing
employee wages during the organizational campaign; and whether it was breached by
suggesting in campaign literature that union representation would have no effect on
pay, benefits, and job security, and that selecting a union representative posed potential
risks with lasting adverse consequences for employees and their families. 1
03
In Dana Corp., an automobile parts manufacturer agreed that it would remain
neutral in the UAW's organizing campaign, but reserved the rights to communicate
"not in an anti-UAW manner, but in a positive pro-Dana manner" and "to speak out in
any manner appropriate when undue provocation is evident in an organizing
campaign. ' 1°4 The arbitrator there found that although the union's handbills might
have constituted "provocation," they did not rise to the level of "undue provocation"
that would allow the employer to respond in an "anti-UAW manner."',
0 5
At a manufacturing plant, the parties had mutually agreed that organizational
campaigns would be "conducted in a manner free of harassment, which does not
misrepresent to employees the facts and circumstances surrounding their employment
and in a manner which does not demean either the Company or the Union as an
organization nor their respective representatives as individuals," and that all
campaigning would be "fair, factual, non-coercive, free from manipulation, and
respectful of the other party."'1 6 The arbitrator there found that the employer had
violated its obligation not to demean the union by sending a letter to its employees
stating that the most effective way to address employee concerns was to "talk
honestly" rather than have the union. 1
07
When an arbitrator is interpreting ambiguous contract provisions, such as those
regarding the scope of permissible communications or union rights of access to
employees during an organizational campaign, the arbitrator is strictly a creature of
contract, with authority from and direct responsibility to the contracting parties. The
Arb.).
99. Yale-New Haven Hospital, slip op. at 1-2 (2007) (Kem, Arb.), DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA),
A- 13 (Oct. 26, 2007), http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/r?Open=vros-78btxa.
100. Id. at 4.
101. Alden N. Shore, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1469 (2004) (Malin, Arb.).
102. Id. at 1497.
103. Id. at 1496-1503.
104. Dana Corp., 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 125, 126 (1981) (Mittenthal, Arb.).
105. Id. at 130-31.
106. Timiken Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 306, 308 (2003) (Duff, Arb.).
107. Id. at 311-12.
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arbitrator has no responsibility to the employees directly affected by the contract, nor,
by definition, does the union that negotiated the agreement have the legal right to serve
as the employees' representative. As a union's duty of fair representation to employees
arises only when the union has the exclusive right to represent those employees, 108 the
union also has no legal obligation to represent the interests of individual employees,
either in negotiating the terms of the neutrality agreement or in presenting the union's
position in arbitration. Nor does the arbitrator have the institutional competence or any
obligation to render awards that are consistent with national labor policy. Indeed, even
if the arbitrator desired guidance from the NLRB on how to approach particular
questions, such as whether any presumptions should operate in interpreting ambiguous
language regarding restrictions on communications, no such guidance would be
available because the NLRB has not articulated any law governing the interpretation of
neutrality agreements. The effect of such privatized decisionmaking is that arbitrators,
by default, are making fundamental national labor policy with regard to such questions
as the nature of appropriate campaigning and the extent of information appropriate for
employees to hear, or not to hear, before making decisions about whether they wish a
union to serve as their exclusive representative.' 
09
B. Arbitral Interpretation of Card Check Provisions
We have seen that an arbitrator interpreting neutrality provisions in an organizing
agreement is asked to go beyond any publicly-defined labor law to place new
limitations upon employer conduct and grant new rights to unions. In contrast, an
arbitrator implementing card check provisions of an organizing agreement is asked
precisely to follow previously articulated labor law, but in a context in which the
procedural mechanisms necessary to do so may not be appropriate or available, and
where the legal doctrines may not be appropriate to apply because of the altered
context.
It is possible that an arbitrator undertaking a card check to determine a union's
majority status might be assuming a responsibility no more demanding than counting
the cards and determining if they constitute a majority of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit. "10 For the task to be so limited, however, the parties must
108. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1944).
109. This critique of arbitrators assuming the authority to decide representation issues
parallels Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards's contractual waiver theory articulated in his academic
and judicial writing. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1501-03 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Edwards, J., concurring); Harry T. Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to
Bargain: A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 23
(1985). Under that theory, arbitrators have the authority to determine statutory rights of
individuals only if the union agreeing to the arbitration is already the employees' exclusive
representative and the statutory rights at issue are those that an exclusive representative is
empowered to waive on behalf of those it represents. Judge Edwards also notes that the
employees' right to select a bargaining representative is non-waivable. See Hammontree, 925
F.2d at 1502; Edwards, supra, at 30.
110. Having a neutral party determine majority status by comparing signed cards to a list of
employees in the bargaining unit is designed to insulate an employer from a violation of Section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2000), which makes it unlawful for an employer to
grant exclusive representative status to a union that lacks majority status, and to insulate a union
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not have placed in dispute any of a wide range of issues that potentially underlie the
question of majority status. Majority status could rest on determining such matters as:
(1) the appropriate bargaining unit; (2) whether specific persons are "employees"
entitled to be included in the bargaining unit; (3) whether authorization cards are too
stale to be counted; (4) whether individual cards are invalid because they were signed
as the result of misrepresentation; (5) whether specific cards are invalid because they
were solicited by supervisors; (6) whether certain cards are invalid because they were
signed as a result of coercion; and (7) whether particular cards were effectively
withdrawn by employees after signing.
The definition of appropriate bargaining units is often hotly contested between
unions and employers because it can determine whether a union will be able to
establish majority status at all."' Often, employers seek to define units as large as
possible or include employee groups thought to be more hostile to organization in
efforts to make the union's organizational task that much more difficult. The NLRA
grants the NLRB broad discretion in defining bargaining units by imposing only a few
limited prohibitions and only the most general affirmative direction. 12 The NLRB has
promulgated only a single narrow regulation on bargaining unit definition"' but
decided a large body of case law articulating bargaining unit definition principles. 1
4
The case law is, however, less than clear because courts have sometimes imposed
conflicting approaches to bargaining unit definition" 5 and because many of the
from violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (2000), which makes it unlawful
for a union lacking majority status to accept exclusive representation. ILGWU v. NLRB
(Bemhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
111. Although bargaining unit definition issues may be presented to some arbitrators
implementing neutrality/card agreements, in other cases, the terms of the contract between the
union and the employer may unambiguously stipulate the scope of the bargaining unit in which
the union's majority is to be determined. It is not inconsistent with federal labor policy for an
employer and a union to be afforded considerable discretion to define a bargaining unit
consensually. The NLRB grants its regional directors authority to approve bargaining unit
definitions stipulated by the parties so long as the Board would "arguably ... find the unit
appropriate." NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, CASEHANDLING MANUAL, PART Two -
REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS, § 11084.2, available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/Publications/Manuals/r_-_casehandlingmanual-(II).aspx.
112. The NLRA directs the NLRB in determining the appropriate bargaining unit "to assure
to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter," 29
U.S.C. § 159(b) (2000), and those rights include not only the right to participate in union
activities but also the right to refrain from such participation. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). The
Board is further directed not to combine professional and non-professional employees in the
absence of the consent of the professional employees, not to preclude designation of a craft unit
because of the prior designation of a different unit unless the craft employees vote against
separate representation, and not to approve a unit including both guard and non-guard
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2000). Section 9(c)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5)
(2000), states that in determining an appropriate bargaining unit "the extent to which the
employees have organized shall not be controlling."
113. A regulation defines acute care hospital bargaining units, but even that regulation is not
controlling in "extraordinary circumstances" or where there are different pre-existing units. 29
C.F.R. § 103.30 (2007).
114. The standard treatise on labor law devotes nearly a hundred pages to the Board's case
law on bargaining units. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 637-730.
115. For example, circuit courts do not agree on the meaning of the statutory language that
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standards that both the Board and the courts apply are inherently subjective and can
easily lead to different results." 6 As the labor arbitrators who are generally asked to
implement card check agreements may not be attorneys, 1 7 arbitrators asked to
determine appropriate bargaining units may not possess the necessary skill
competently to research and interpret bargaining unit definition doctrine. Even
arbitrators with labor law expertise may find it difficult accurately to duplicate NLRB
bargaining unit definition outcomes because of doctrinal indeterminacy.
Once the Board or an arbitrator has concluded which employee job titles are
contained within the appropriate bargaining unit, a new task arises of determining
which specific employees fall within that bargaining unit. There may be disputes about
whether specific persons satisfy the statutory exclusions from the definition of
"employee" as a result of being, for example, supervisors or independent contractors.
Here, too, the NLRB has created an elaborate body of case law to further structure the
inquiry into which persons are "employees" entitled to be within a bargaining unit. 118
Even those persons who are not excluded by the definition of "employee," may be kept
outside the bargaining unit by virtue of another body of Board doctrine that excludes
persons who have insufficient attachment to the workforce. This case law, for example,
may exclude certain seasonal or occasional employees, part-time employees, or those
who are on leave or on layoff status. i l9 As with bargaining unit definitional issues,
questions of which specific persons are properly within the bargaining unit may require
arbitrators to resolve contested issues that may stretch or exceed the arbitrator's
knowledge of labor law.
Under Board doctrine, authorization cards must be "current" to be counted. The
Board takes account of the circumstances of each case in determining whether a
particular card was signed sufficiently close in time to the date of the card count to be
specifies that the union's extent of organization shall not be controlling in defining a bargaining
unit as appropriate. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (2000). Compare NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68
F.3d 1577 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Board gave unlawful controlling weight to extent of
organization by presuming appropriateness of union-proposed unit), with NLRB v. Lake County
Ass'n for the Retarded, 128 F.3d 1181 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the extent of organization is
controlling only if no other factor plays a significant role in determining the outcome). These
two cases are compared in GORMAN & FrINKN, supra note 1, at 92-94.
116. GORMAN&FINKiN, supra note 1, at 88.
117. The most comprehensive survey of practicing labor arbitrators concluded that about
half have a legal education. MARIO F. BOGNANNO & CHARLES J. COLEMAN, LABOR ARBITRATION
IN AMERICA: THE PROFESSION AND PRACTICE 26 (1992). A 1999 survey of the most experienced
labor arbitrators, those who are members of the National Academy of Arbitrators, found that
61.4% had a law degree. Michel G. Picher, Ronald L. Seeber & David B. Lipsky, The
Arbitration Profession in Transition: Preliminary Results From a Survey of the National
Academy ofArbitrators, in ARBITRATION 1999: QUO VADIS? THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, 241, 247 (Jay E. Grenig & Steven Briggs eds., 2000).
118. The NLRA excludes both a "supervisor" and an "independent contractor" from the
definition of an "employee" whose rights are protected by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
The Act defines the characteristics that indicate supervisory status. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000).
For an overview of NLRB decisions elaborating upon the nature of supervisor and independent
contractor status see THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 2262-74 (supervisor) and
2285-98 (independent contractor).
119. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 2674-75.
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included in the count.' 20 When an arbitrator is asked to perform a card check, there
may be questions about whether the parties have, by contract, explicitly or implicitly
shortened or extended the NLRB's standards for the currency of cards and, if they did
so, whether the arbitrator should enforce that alteration of governing law. For example,
a contract might include both a directive to the arbitrator to follow the law under the
NLRA as well as a provision defining how old a card may be to be included in the
count. In any case, the arbitrator may need to engage in a fact-finding process to assess
precisely when specific cards were signed.
Board doctrine regarding misrepresentations that may occur during the card-signing
process is divided, with some kinds of misrepresentations considered to be sufficient to
invalidate a card and others considered entirely irrelevant. The Board will invalidate
cards from employees who signed them after receiving information from a union
representative that, in essence, told them that the card's purpose was not, as it said on
its face, to authorize the union to represent the employee, but rather for some other
purpose, such as to permit the employee to attend a union meeting or to enable the
union to obtain a secret ballot election.' 2' In the arbitration setting, making the
determination of whether a misrepresentation is sufficient to invalidate a card is highly
problematic because of the ways in which the arbitrator's fact-finding procedure differs
from that of the NLRB. As is discussed below in Part III.C., the arbitrator presides
over a process that is adversarial, in which responsibility for gathering and presenting
evidence vests in the union and the employer. In contrast, the NLRB, as a federal
administrative agency, has confidential investigatory powers that can be used to gather
information in a manner that can better protect vulnerable employees from retaliation
and the fear of retaliation. The ability of the NLRB, as a neutral government agency, to
gather information from employees in a more protected setting is also likely to lead to
more accurate testimony less influenced by fears of retaliation or the excesses of an
adversarial presentation.
While misrepresentations to employees regarding the effect of signing an
authorization card are relevant to Board determinations of majority status, the Board
leaves wholly unregulated other misrepresentations that do not rise to the level of
fraud. 22 Thus, false statements of fact by unions and employers, whether intentional or
inadvertent, that surely occur in the course of most organizational campaigns, are not
considered by the NLRB to be either unfair labor practices nor grounds for setting
aside election results. 123 Consequently, the Board takes no action when parties make
these kinds of misrepresentations, such as those that misstate such matters as the level
of the employer's profits, the obligations of union dues, or the wages and benefits
obtained by the union at other workplaces. 124 One of the Board's reasons for
deregulating campaign misrepresentations was the belief that free speech was more
likely than regulation to produce the desired "laboratory conditions" in which
120. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN
REPRESENTATION CASES, § 5-500 (2005), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/
manuals/r-_caseoutline.aspx.
121. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 606-09 (1969); Colonial Lincoln
Mercury Sales, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 54, 65-66 (1972), enforced, 485 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1973).
122. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982).
123. GoRMAN & FNKIN, supra note 1, at 188-190.
124. Id.
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employees could make a free choice about union representation.' 25 Only truly free
speech can potentially provide a corrective to erroneous statements of fact. The
NLRB's policy is based on a campaign environment in which both sides may speak
freely, but the arbitrator is regulating a campaign in which one side is contractually
silenced. It seems problematic for arbitrators to adopt the NLRB's policy of accepting
authorizations cards obtained in the midst of false factual representations if falsehoods
are so relevant and serious as to put the cards' validity in question. On the other hand,
it would be similarly problematic if arbitrators implementing neutrality/card check
agreements could develop an alternative policy for the regulation of campaign speech
that was based on neither existing labor law nor the parties' contractual agreement.
The final listed issues that might come before arbitrators address the circumstances
under which authorization cards were improperly solicited or arguably withdrawn.
These issues raise the same sort of problematic adversarial fact-finding that an
arbitrator would encounter in attempting to discern whether card solicitors
misrepresented to employees the purpose of card signing. In addition, if the issue is
one of supervisory solicitation, the arbitrator would also have to decide if the particular
solicitor possessed supervisory status, an issue addressed by the NLRA but encrusted
with decades of technical case law decisions.' 
26
In summary, when an arbitrator is asked to enforce the provisions of a
neutrality/card check agreement, the arbitrator is assuming tasks far different than
those encountered when enforcing typical provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. The arbitrator may be asked to create policy of national significance in
areas in which the NLRA and the NLRB offer no guidance. With regard to other tasks,
the arbitrator may be asked to apply established NLRA and NLRB doctrine, but may
lack the expertise to do so or may, in doing so, apply those legal doctrines within an
alternative environment where they may no longer be appropriate.
C. Arbitral Procedures for Fact Finding under Neutrality/Card Check Agreements
Whether the arbitrator is determining issues under the neutrality or the card check
provisions of an organizing agreement, the arbitrator is likely to encounter not only
questions of what rules to apply but also questions of fact. The arbitrator's procedural
authority, however, lacks many of the procedural mechanisms inherent in the NLRB's
administrative process that promote accurate fact-finding and protect vulnerable
employees.
The NLRB has independent investigatory powers to find facts in an effort to
determine what position to take regarding an issue. The Board agent conducting the
investigation is directed to approach the inquiry from a neutral perspective and to seek
out all relevant evidence so as to offer as complete a factual picture as possible.127 The
Board agent is expected to pursue all promising leads regardless of whether they were
125. Midland, 263 N.L.R.B. at 129-30.
126. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 2262-74; supra note 118.
127. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, CASEHANDLNG MANUAL, PART ONE - UNFAIR




PRIVA TIZING LABOR LAW
suggested by a party. 128 Board agents are instructed to avoid interviewing third-party
witnesses, such as employees, on the charged party's premises. 29 They are also
instructed not to permit party representatives to be present during the interviews.'
30
The NLRB normally affords such third-party witnesses the right to have counsel or
another representative present during the interview. 131 In order to encourage open and
honest accounts, the Board agent may offer reluctant third-party witnesses
confidentiality and statutory protection from retaliation.' 32 If the investigating agent
encounters an uncooperative witness, the NLRB has authority "to issue subpoenas ad
testificandum and duces tecum to third-party witnesses whenever the evidence sought
would materially aid in the determination of whether a charge allegation has merit and
whenever such evidence cannot be obtained by reasonable voluntary means."1 33 When
contacting the charged party, Board agents are expected to avoid disclosing the identity
of those who have been interviewed and to avoid revealing factual details that might
help to identify a witness. 134 NLRB agents document the statements of interviewees in
sworn affidavits. 135 Board agents can assure interviewees that their affidavits will
remain confidential unless it is necessary for the affidavit to be produced in connection
with a formal proceeding.' 36 For example, if the Board's regional office obtains
affidavits that persuade it that there are insufficient valid authorization cards to seek a
bargaining order, it will simply not pursue a bargaining order and the names of the
witnesses to whom it spoke and the content of their affidavits will never be revealed.
The Board has special procedures for investigations in which the authenticity or
validity of authorization cards is in question. Board agents are expected to attempt to
interview every union agent who solicited cards and, in some cases, every person who
signed a card. 137 If individual card signers cannot be located, agents are authorized to
obtain expert testimony to determine the validity of card signatures. 3 8 The Board may
use its investigatory subpoena power to obtain employer records necessary for
identifying employees as members of the relevant bargaining unit.' 
39
The arbitrator with an obligation to engage in fact-finding regarding issues identical
to or similar to those addressed by the NLRB faces the task with a much more limited
and problematic array of procedural tools. Most fundamentally, the arbitrator presides
over an adversarial process rather than an investigatory one. The arbitrator is
dependent upon the parties to investigate and present the evidence. The arbitrator does
128. Id. at § 10054.
129. Id. at § 10054.3.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2000) (declaring that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer to discriminate against an employee for giving testimony under the NLRA).
133. ULP CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 127, at § 10054.3.
134. Id. at § 10054.4.
135. Id. at § 10060.
136. Id. at § 10060.5; see also 29 C.F.R. § 102.118 (2007) (statements given to Board agents
are confidential, except that if the person who gave the statement later testifies in an NLRB
administrative proceeding, a copy of any such prior statement in the possession of the NLRB
General Counsel must, on motion, be given to the respondent).
137. ULP CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 127, at § 10066.1.
138. Id.
139. Id. at § 10066.2.
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not control the circumstances in which, in preparation for a hearing before the
arbitrator, the union and the employer seek to obtain information from employees
about the circumstances of card signing or the nature of party election
communications. The union and the employer are themselves necessarily initiating
interviews with employees in preparation for those hearings. Far from being a neutral
investigator who affords employees the promise of confidentiality and the protections
of administrative law, the employer and the union single out individual employees,
who have no counsel or other representation. The employer and the union are also
likely able easily to intimidate employees or cause them to fear retaliation for giving
testimony adverse to the interests of the interrogating party. While employee witnesses
who appear before labor arbitrators in claims arising under collective bargaining
agreements are protected from retaliation for their testimony by the "just cause"
provisions of those agreements, 140 employee witnesses in neutrality/card check
hearings are unlikely to have any similar contractual protection.141
Although the NLRB has clear and broad subpoena authority as well as the ability, in
many cases, to obtain information by making a party aware of the agency's power to
decide issues adversely in the absence of requested information, the existence of
arbitral authority to subpoena witnesses and documents and to issue discovery orders is
far from clear. Although arbitrators deciding issues arising under collective bargaining
agreements can draw upon the parties' mutual obligations derived from the NLRA to
provide information necessary for the arbitration process, 142 the parties to many
neutrality/card check agreements have no pre-existing exclusive representative status
from which a statutory duty to provide information could derive. To the extent the
parties lack such status, the arbitrator's authority to issue subpoenas becomes more
uncertain. 143 Because neutrality/card check agreements are enforceable under § 301 of
140. See LAURA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, ADR IN THE WORKPLACE
278-79 (2d ed. 2005) (if a collective bargaining agreement contains a "just cause" provision, as
nearly all do, arbitrators may overturn an employer's discipline of an employee if, in the view of
the arbitrator, the employer's discipline lacked "just cause"). Arbitrators have also found
implicit authority in collective bargaining agreements to protect employees from retaliation by
unions for the employee's testimony in a labor arbitration proceeding. ELKOURI & ELKOURI,
supra note 81, at 425-26.
141. The article by Professors Eaton and Kreisky reporting on provisions included in
neutrality/card check agreements makes no mention of any contracts containing protections for
employees testifying in arbitration proceedings to enforce the agreements. Eaton & Kriesky,
supra note 4. The AFL-CIO's manual for unions entering into neutrality/card check agreements
includes numerous sample contract provisions, but none addressing job protections for
employees testifying in arbitration proceedings to enforce the agreement. AFL-CIO, supra note
86.
142. See Laura J. Cooper, Discovery in Labor Arbitration, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1281, 1290-93,
1326-27 (1988).
143. There is a remarkable lack of clarity with regard to the source and scope of subpoena
powers, even for arbitrators whose authority is derived from collective bargaining agreements.
See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 81, at 355-62; Timothy Heinsz, An Arbitrator's
Authority to Subpoena: A Power in Need of Clarification, in ARBITRATION 1985: LAW AND
PRACTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 201 (Walter J. Gershenfeld ed., 1986).
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the Labor Management Relations Act,' 44 arbitrators do have broad authority to
determine appropriate procedures to the extent the parties' agreement lacks procedural
direction. 145 Labor arbitrators, however, rarely encounter discovery requests in the
normal course of hearing cases arising under collective bargaining agreements. In that
setting, arbitration only occurs at the end of a series of steps in a contractual grievance
procedure in which information is exchanged-meetings that amount to settlement
conferences with parties of increasing settlement authority. 1
46
When administering a neutrality/card check agreement, there is no parallel
preceding grievance process to satisfy the need for pre-hearing information exchange.
Consequently, labor arbitrators need to rethink their habitual reluctance to facilitate a
discovery process. Arbitrators operating under neutrality/card check agreements need
to craft discovery standards and processes to assure the fundamental fairness of their
fact-finding efforts. It is hardly fair, for example, to expect a union immediately to
respond in the course of a hearing to an employer claim that a particular authorization
card was obtained by improper means when the union has had no prior notice that the
communication between a specific employee and a specific card solicitor would be put
at issue. It is asking a great deal to expect the arbitrator, on an ad hoc basis, fairly to
craft a specific discovery regime appropriate to the context of neutrality/card check
proceedings.
This comparison of the procedural mechanisms and powers available to the NLRB
and to arbitrators acting under neutrality/card check agreements makes evident that
arbitrators are left with a decidedly inferior ability accurately to determine the facts
underlying disputed issues. Arbitrators are limited to hearing only evidence that was
gathered to support the adversarial position of a party-evidence acquired and
presented under circumstances that lack critical protections to ensure its reliability.
Significantly, the adversarial arbitral process may put vulnerable workers at risk since
it requires potential employee witnesses to be interviewed in private by interested
parties and obligates them to give their testimony in open hearings before unions and
employers alike.
D. Arbitral Determination of Remedies Under Neutrality/Card Check Agreements
When the NLRB encounters unfair labor practices or behavior that violates its
standards for the conduct of organizing campaigns, its remedial authority is defined by
statute and elaborated by established case law doctrine. When labor arbitrators
function in their usual setting under collective bargaining agreements, their remedial
authority is relatively well-defined by the traditions of arbitral practice, the so-called
"common law" of arbitration,1 47 and the decisions of reviewing courts that have
occasionally limited the exercise of that authority. 14' An arbitrator who finds that a
144. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
145. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987); Cooper,
supra note 142, at 1313-16.
146. See COOPER ET AL., supra note 140, at 16-18 (providing a description of grievance
procedures under collective bargaining agreements).
147. See generally Marvin F. Hill, Jr., Remedies in Arbitration, in THE COMMON LAW OF THE
WORKPLACE: TiH ViEW OF ARBITRATORS 355 (Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 2d ed. 2005).
148. Courts generally afford broad deference to arbitrator's decisions. See supra notes 55-57
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party has violated the terms of a neutrality/card check agreement, however, cannot
draw directly on either of these remedial traditions when determining appropriate
remedies.
Congress and the Supreme Court have restricted the range of remedies available to
the NLRB. The NLRA limits Board remedies to "affirmative action" that will
"effectuate the policies" of the Act. 149 The Supreme Court has held that this language
precludes the Board from awarding punitive damages.150 The Supreme Court's
articulated catalogue of remedies available to the NLRB does not include, for example,
damages to reimburse a union for its costs incurred in an organizing campaign that
failed because of the employer's unfair labor practices. 151 The NLRB has held that,
even if it has such statutory authority, it will decline to order an employer to reimburse
a union for its excess organizational costs even if "a nexus has been shown between
such excess costs incurred by a union and the unfair labor practices committed by an
employer."' 5 2 Instead, NLRB remedies for campaign violations are limited to orders to
cease and desist, posting of notices, rerun elections, and in egregious cases, bargaining
orders, but those are only available in cases in which the union at some time
demonstrated majority status through authorization cards. 153 While arbitrators acting
under collective bargaining agreements do award damages in appropriate cases, the
tradition generally limits those damages to make-whole remedies and those are most
often relatively modest sums, such as a discharged employee's lost wages less interim
earnings. 1
54
The arbitrator seeking to impose remedies for violations of a neutrality/card check
agreement thus faces particular challenges. Although an arbitrator might readily issue a
declaration that a majority of employees in the bargaining unit have authorized the
union to represent them, the arbitrator may reasonably assume that the authority to
order an employer to bargain with a union as the exclusive representative of the
employer's employees is a power reserved to the NLRB alone. In any case,
circumstances in which neutrality/card check agreements were breached are likely to
be those in which the union is alleging that the employer's violations precluded the
union from gaining an authorization card majority, a circumstance in which even the
NLRB believes it inappropriate to issue a bargaining order. 1
55
Thus confronting circumstances in which bargaining orders would be inappropriate
even if permitted and generally lacking experience in issuing significant damage
and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held that even greater deference should be
given to arbitrator's remedial decisions because of the need for flexibility in designing remedies
in disparate circumstances. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 68-69.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000).
150. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940).
151. See id. at 12.
152. Heck's Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 765, 767 (1974).
153. HOW TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NLRB 556-64 (Brent Garren, Elaine S. Fox & John
C. Truesdale, eds., 7th ed., 2000) (overview of Board remedies); NLRB v. Gissel Packing, Inc.,
395 U.S. 575,614 (1969) (Board may issue bargaining order if union had once attained majority
support); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 585 (1984) (Board lacks authority to issue
bargaining order if majority status never attained).
154. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 81, at 1201-02; THE COMMON LAW OF THE
WORKPLACE, supra note 81, at § 10.17.
155. Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 585 (1984).
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awards, arbitrators have found themselves uncertain of their authority to remedy
violations of neutrality/card check agreements. The law affords arbitrators in this
setting no remedial guidance, and contracts are unlikely to include remedial directives.
How, then, have arbitrators resolved this remedial dilemma in those cases in which
they have found contract violations?
In Dana Corp., arbitrator Richard Mittenthal awarded the UAW damages of
$10,000, based on his conclusion that the employer's violation of neutrality provisions
had deprived the union of the benefit of its investment in the organizing campaign and
required it to expend additional resources to continue the effort.' 5 6 In Alden North
Shore, arbitrator Martin H. Malin declined to adopt a similar remedy because he found
no evidence there that the employer's violations had diminished the value of the
union's organizing efforts and the union had offered no evidence of its organizing
costs. 157 Instead, he ordered the employer to cease and desist in its violations, to post
and distribute various notices to employees listing its violations and promising
neutrality, and to distribute union flyers with employee paychecks. ISS In Timken
Company, arbitrator James Clair Duff, finding that the employer had violated its
agreement by improperly demeaning the union in a campaign communication, rejected
union remedial requests (unstated in the award) as excessive, and instead ordered the
employer strictly to adhere to the agreement in the future and to pay the full costs of
the arbitration proceeding.' 
59
By far, the most extraordinary remedy for violations of an organizing agreement was
recently imposed by arbitrator Margaret M. Kern against Yale-New Haven Hospital. 1
60
Arbitrator Kern, a former NLRB administrative law judge, found that the hospital's
numerous violations constituted "a methodical dismantling of the terms and
commitments" of the parties' agreement.16' Despite the extensive employer violations,
she nevertheless rejected the union's request for a bargaining order, both on the ground
that the union's majority status had not been conclusively established, but more
fundamentally because she was not persuaded that she had the authority to issue a
bargaining order. 162 The extent of her condemnation of the employer's conduct,
however, was evidenced by the overwhelming size of the damage remedy she awarded.
Arbitrator Kern directed the hospital to reimburse the union for the entire cost of its
organizing effort of over $2.2 million. 163 In addition to remedying harm to the union,
the arbitrator concluded that the employer's violations damaged individual employees
by threatening them, forcing them to attend mandatory meetings, and depriving them
of factual campaign information. To remedy harm to individual employees, the
156. Dana Corp., 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 125, 132 (1981) (Mittenthal, Arb.). Arbitrator
Mittenthal also ordered the employer to send a letter to employees repudiating its contract
violation and promising neutrality, to afford the union an opportunity to address the employees,
and to agree to an expedited NLRB election. Id.
157. Alden N. Shore, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1469, 1512 (2004) (Malin, Arb.).
158. Id. at 1513-14.
159. Timken Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 306, 311-12 (2003) (Duff, Arb.).
160. Yale-New Haven Hospital, slip op. (2007) (Kern, Arb.), DAMLY LAB. REP. (BNA), A- 13
(Oct. 26, 2007), http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/r?Open=vros-78btxa.
161. Id. at 43.
162. Id. at 41.
163. Id. at 44.
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arbitrator decided that the cumulative harm to the employees could be measured by the
amount of money that the employer had paid to campaign consultants who facilitated
the employer's violations, a sum also exceeding $2.2 million. 164 As a result, she
ordered that amount to be divided equally among the 1736 bargaining unit members,
giving each in excess of $1200.165 Subsequently, the employer paid the employees as
ordered by the arbitrator and, after initially disputing the arbitrator's order to reimburse
the union for its expenses, settled with the union for $2 million.'66
This review of arbitrators' remedial orders demonstrates that arbitrators have
struggled with both the extent of their remedial authority and the appropriate exercise
of their remedial discretion. Just as the substantive rules arbitrators impose on parties
to such agreements, and the procedural mechanisms they devise, have broad public
policy implications, so do the remedies that arbitrators choose to apply in the absence
of statutory or contractual direction. In this respect, arbitrators who have no authority
and little procedural structure to determine and apply public policy are being thrust
into that role.
CONCLUSION
Neutrality/card check agreements have become increasingly widespread and highly
successful in achieving union representation. Such agreements intentionally displace
the traditional statutory process for determining union representational status. They
place communicational limits on employers beyond those imposed by law, afford
unions access to employees beyond those required by law, and provide for union
recognition in the absence of NLRB-conducted elections. Neutrality/card check
agreements are nevertheless currently considered legally valid and consistent with
national labor policy. One important effect of these agreements has not previously
been seriously addressed: neutrality/card check agreements give private arbitrators the
authority to make decisions with broad public policy implications. Arbitrators
exercising authority under these agreements are privately making fundamental labor
policy by determining substantive employer communication rights and union access
rights, implementing card check recognition procedures, creating adjudicative
procedural structures, and determining remedies. These public policy functions would
be more properly accomplished by a public forum. 167 As the NLRB, Congress and the
164. Id. at 47.
165. Id.
166. Health Care Employees, Yale-New Haven Hospital, District 1199 Reach
Settlement Over Election Dispute, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) at A- 10 (Aug. 18, 2008).
167. The NLRB has recently issued a notice of proposed rulemaking for a new type of
representation election that could provide an alternative to arbitrator-administered card checks
for unions and employers that desire expeditious determination of majority status and are
willing to stipulate to the terms for the election. 73 Fed. Reg. 10199 (proposed Feb. 26, 2008)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101, 102). Under the proposed procedure, employers and unions
could jointly submit petitions for a Board-conducted election without providing any initial
showing of the extent of employee support for the union. The joint petition would have to
include a stipulated bargaining unit and election date less than 28 days hence as well as a list of
names and addresses of employees eligible to vote. The Board would conduct the election as
requested so long as the petition was complete and accurate and the bargaining unit description
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courts focus, as they will in the near future, on the legal status of neutrality pledges and
authorization-card-based recognition, they should not fail to consider whether the
present regime of privatized labor law should be allowed to continue in its present
form or whether it should be guided by or replaced by public law made by public
institutions.
"appropriate on its face and not contrary to any statutory provision." Id. at 10199. Any election
or post-election dispute would be resolved with finality by the Board's Regional Director. It is
uncertain how the current existence of Board-member vacancies would affect the likelihood of
the proposed rule being promulgated. As of August 2008, there are three vacancies on the five-
member Board. See Press Release, R-2653, National Labor Relations Board, Labor Board
Temporarily Delegates Litigation Authority to General Counsel; Will Issue Decisions with Two
Members After Members Kirsanow and Walsh Depart (Dec. 28, 2007),
http://www.nlrb.gov/About-Us/News-Room/press-archives.aspx.
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